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Abstract  
A growing literature in economics examines the development of preferences among children 
and adolescents. We combine a repeated dictator game with treatments that either provides 
participants with information about the average behavior of others or not. In a sample of 384 
children aged 5-17, we find an increase in donations until the age of 13-14, but not beyond. 
We find no effect of social information on average donation behavior in any of the studied 
age-groups, but do find effects on the distributions of donations. 
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1. Introduction 
Social preferences are important for a range of social and economic outcomes, including 
cooperation, contractual arrangements and market outcomes (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). 
The effect of others’ behavior on one’s own has generated much interest in economics (see 
Shang and Croson, 2009, for a review). Models of altruism predict that donations of others 
will reduce one’s own donation (e.g., Becker, 1974). As the recipient receives more, the 
marginal benefit of donating decreases and hence, own donations decrease too. Other models, 
based on for example conformity, predict that information about others’ donations increases 
own donations (e.g., Bernheim, 1994). Social information serves to signal the norm of 
donating, and wishing to conform, own donations increase in others’ donations.  In the 
context of charitable giving, increases in others’ donations may therefore either reduce 
(substitute) or increase (complement) one’s own donation.  
Recent work has explored pro-social preferences among children (e.g., Harbaugh et al., 
2003; List and Samak, 2013) and reputational effects of social information on charitable 
giving (Servátka, 2009; Reinstein and Riener, 2012).  To the best of our knowledge, no 
previous study has explored the sensitivity to social information across age-groups in the 
context of charitable giving. We conduct a 5-period dictator game with 384 students evenly 
spread over the age-groups 5-6, 9-10, 13-14 and 16-17, with a charitable organization as the 
recipient (similar to Eckel and Grossman, 1996). This is combined with treatments that either 
provide information about the donations of others’ or not as in Cason and Mui (1998). These 
authors found in an adult population that learning about socially relevant information 
influences decision in a sequential dictator game; subjects become more selfish in their 
“irrelevant information” treatment but do not become more selfish in their “relevant 
information” treatment. Our study contributes by examining the relevance of social 
information within different age-groups.  
The literature on the development of social preferences among children has generally 
found a positive relationship between pro-social behaviors and age. For example, older 
children tend to be more fair (Gummerum et al., 2010; Takezawa et al., 2006), more trusting 
(Sutter and Kocher, 2007), more egalitarian (Bennenson et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008) and 
more cooperative (Harbaugh and Krause, 2000). Closer to our domain of inquiry, Bennenson 
et al. (2007), conduct a dictator game with children aged 4, 6 and 9 years, and find that older 
children donate more, although altruistic behavior is present at all ages. Harbaugh et al. 
(2003) conduct a dictator game with children aged 7, 9, 10, 14, 18 years and find a positive 
relationship between donations and age, and that girls donate slightly more than boys. That 
girls behave more altruistically than boys has been repeatedly found in studies on the 
development of pro-social behaviors (Eisenberg and Fabes, 1998) and recently by 
Gummerum et al. (2010).  
We contribute to this literature by examining both the relationship between donations 
and age, as well as gender differences in this pattern. Also relevant for our study is the work 
by Harbaugh and Krause (2000) who combine a multi-period public good game with a 
dictator game and subjects aged 6-12 years. They find that while younger children tend to 
increase their contributions over rounds, older children behave more like adults and decrease 
their contributions.  Older children seem to learn to free ride faster than younger children, 
although they are initially more cooperative. The authors, however, raise concerns about 
whether these patterns may be due to confusion among the younger participants in their 
experiment as it often takes many rounds for adults to learn the freeriding strategy. We 
contribute to this literature by examining multi-period altruistic behaviour in a less 
cognitively demanding task. If similar patterns are obtain in a repeated dictator game, our 
confidence in the ability of young children to maintain socially beneficial outcomes increases.  
In addition, we examine the effect of social information on the development of 
conformity with age.  The donation of others may be a complement to one’s own donation for 
some individuals and a substitute for others. While social information may or may not affect 
donations on average, it may lead to conformity despite heterogeneity of underlying social 
preferences. An emerging literature examines adherence to social norms when analysing 
altruism and its development with age (Bennenson et al., 2007; Eckel et al., 2011) while 
others have investigated whether the tendency to conform with a norm differs with gender 
(Cadsby and Mayne, 1998). This paper contributes to this literature by analysing the 
development of conformity with age as well as gender differences in this development.   
Most papers concerning the development of preferences for charitable giving have to 
date mainly studied western samples. For example, Harbaugh and Krause (2010) recruit 
subjects in Albuquerque, New Mexico and Bennenson et al. (2007) and Gummerum et al. 
(2010) recruited subjects from England. Studies using non-western samples provide an 
important robustness check as populations may vary considerably with respect to patterns of 
economic decision-making (Henrich et al., 2010). 1  In this paper we use a sample from 
Colombia. In this way, our paper contributes by documenting behavioral patterns in a non-
western sample.  
Evidence on gender differences in pro-social preferences among adults is inconclusive. 
Some find that women exhibit more pro-socially oriented behaviors while others find the 
opposite. It has been suggested that the observed heterogeneity may be due to women’s 
relative sensitivity to context and social cues (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a review). 
Our paper provides a test of this notion by comparing the effect of social information 
provision on males and females.   
We find a general increase in average donations with age but we fail to find any gender 
differences in this trend. We find that children aged 5-6 increase their donations over periods 
while donations of children aged 9-10 and 13-14 follow and inverted U-shape, peaking in 
period 3. Children aged 16-17, however, decrease their donations across periods. With respect 
to social information, we do not find any evidence that social information affects average 
donation behavior at any of the investigated ages. We find, however, that for some age groups 
providing information about the average donation in the previous period has a significant 
effect on the proportion of subjects that in the present period contributes more than the 
average in the previous period. This holds for age groups 5-6 and 16-17. We also find some 
evidence of conformity among the subjects aged 13-14 years, and significant gender 
differences within these age groups in the proportion of subjects that donate above, equal or 
below the average donation.  
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 outlines our experimental design and 
procedure and section 3 describes the results. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Experimental design and procedure 
We designed a 5-period repeated dictator game in which children were given the opportunity 
to donate to a charitable foundation, Fe y Alegría, active in a number of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. 2  The foundation provides schooling for the poorest children in the 
region. We chose this organization as it is well-known among children of all ages in the 
                                                          
1 See also the discussion by Gächter (2010). 
2 See Eckel and Grossman (1996) for an early contribution using the Red Cross as recipient. 
Aburrá Valley, Colombia, and at the school where we conducted our study. For example, 
children growing up in the region are frequently made aware of the children at Fe y Alegría 
and schools organize fundraising campaigns for the foundation.  
At the start of each period, children were endowed with 10 stickers and were told they 
could donate, all, some or none, to Fe y Alegría. Previous research by Bennenson et al. (2007) 
and Gummerun et al. (2010) has found that stickers are considered a valuable resource and 
therefore appropriate for dictator games with children. In particular, comprehension among 
the youngest children was a concern and the stickers offered the practical advantage of being 
possible to paste into the appropriate box on the decision sheet. Children were also informed 
at this stage about the exchange rate of the stickers, which were calibrated such that the total 
endowment would equal an average weekly allowance for the relevant age-group; 50 stickers 
equalled 1250, 3500, 7000 or 10500 Colombian Pesos. 3  In this way, we aimed to keep 
opportunity cost constant across ages rather than the monetary endowment.4 In no round were 
the children informed that there would be a next round, or which was the last round. At the 
end of the game, the children were paid in cash according to the sum of the stickers they had 
kept for themselves. 
We employed two treatments in a pen-and-paper experiment. In the “no information” 
treatment, children played the dictator game without any information about the behavior of 
their peers. In the “information treatment,” the average donation of the group was announced 
between periods. The study was conducted at the Rafael J. Mejía school, Aburrá Valley, 
Colombia, in 2012. Children were informed prior to the visit that they would be playing 
games where they could earn money. Written consent was provided by the parents of each 
participating child and only a small fraction of invited children did not present a signed 
consent form.    
We conducted 8 sessions with about 50 children in each. We opted for larger 
experimental sessions to achieve unified information about the average donation rather than 
several smaller sessions with variation in the provided information. From the children who 
had expressed interest in participation and presented a signed consent form, we randomly 
assigned participants to each treatment. We aimed for 100 subjects in each age group, but the 
youngest age group only had 84 children. All of these participate in our experiment.  Once 
                                                          
3 Exchange rate at the time of the experiment was USD 1 = COP 1820. 
4 See e.g., Kocher et al., (2012) for a discussion of this design choice.   
offered to participate, no child opted out of the experiment. The experiment started with the 
experimenter distributing experimental id-numbers to all participants, after which instructions 
for the dictator game were distributed (see appendix A) and read aloud to all children, who 
could ask questions in private.5 The experimenter then handed out decision sheets for the first 
round. Once participants had indicated their decisions, the experimenter collected the decision 
sheets and distributed the next decision sheet. In the information treatment, the mean donation 
of the period was announced prior to distributing the next decision sheet. This procedure was 
repeated for the five rounds in each treatment.   
Once the five rounds had been completed, participants exited the room, were instructed 
to line up, and re-entered one-by-one to receive their payment in private. A session lasted 
about 90 minutes including payment. Upon payment, participants filled in a short 
questionnaire containing a few demographic and socioeconomic questions. Once all sessions 
had been completed, a cash donation was made to Fe y Alegría and a copy of the receipt was 
exhibited at the school.  
 
3. Results 
384 children participated in our study; 84 children are 5-6 years old, 100 children are 9-10, 
100 children are 13-14 and 100 are 16-17, equally divided between the two treatments. In the 
information treatment, 56% are male and in the no information treatment, 60% were male, 
reflecting the male-female distribution at the school. Our descriptive statistics in Figure 1 
suggest that mean donations for the full sample (all ages) are similar to previous studies with 
charitable organizations as receivers (see e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Martinsson et al., 
2012). Comparing the pooled mean donations across age-groups reveals that both the 
“Young” (9-10 years) and the “Middle” (13-14 years) age-group donate significantly more 
than the “Very young” (5-6 years). Finally, the “Oldest” (16-17 years) age-group donates 
significantly less than all other age-groups.  
Figure 1 about here 
A similar pattern is found in the treated and untreated samples. In the untreated sample, 
the Very young and Young donate about the same, and the Middle age-group donates 
significantly more than both. Finally, the Oldest donate significantly less than all other age-
                                                          
5 In our experiment, all participants were literate.  
groups on average. In the treated sample, the donation pattern is similar to that of the 
untreated sample. Since these results include all periods, we turn to first period donations to 
address the relationship between age and donation behavior and present these results in Table 
1 below.  Since in the first period no information is provided in either of the treatments, we 
pool the data from both.  
Table 1 about here 
Period 1 mean donations increase significantly from 4.67 among the very young to 5.38 
among the young (p < 0.05; very young vs. young) and then to 5.93 among the middle age-
group (p < 0.05; young vs. middle). The mean donation of 6.62 of the oldest is not statistically 
different from the contributions of the young (p > 0.4) or the middle age-group (p > 0.3). With 
respect to gender, we cannot find any statistically significant differences between males and 
females within age-groups (see table 1).  We summarize these findings below: 
 
Result 1. Period 1 mean donations increase with age, peaks at age 13-14 and keeps constant 
at the age of 16-17.  There are no gender differences in mean donations within age-groups.  
 
We next describe patterns of mean donations by period. Figure 2 (Panel A) describes 
mean donations by period for all ages jointly, but broken down by treatment. We see that 
when pooling the age-groups, we observe no significant differences between mean donations 
in the first period. In the treated sample, mean donations compared to period 1, are 
significantly higher in all subsequent periods (p < 0.01). In the treated sample, mean 
donations compared to period 1 are significantly higher in all subsequent periods (p < 0.01). 
In period 4, mean donation in the treated sample is significantly higher than in the untreated 
sample, but only at the 10%-level (p < 0.1). On average, it does not seem that social 
information is very effective in terms of increasing mean donations across periods. 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Result 2. On average, social information does not increase mean donations over periods.  
 
In Figure 3, panels A-D, we repeat this analysis for each of the age-groups separately.  
In panel A, we see a positive time trend; in both the treated and untreated sample, donations 
significantly increase across period. For example, the difference between mean donations of 
the first and last period is significant in both subsamples (p < 0.01). Panel B reveals a similar 
pattern to panel A, but the mean donation is higher in the untreated than in the treated sample. 
These differences, however, are not significant. In panel C and D, mean donations are stable 
across periods. In panel C, mean donations in the untreated sample is significantly higher than 
in the treated sample (p < 0.01) while in panel D, the opposite holds (p < 0.01).  Furthermore, 
while untreated donations increase in the very young sample, they increase only initially up to 
period 3 in the young and middle sample. In the oldest sample, mean donations in the 
untreated sample are stable at a low level.  
 
Result 3. Mean donations in the untreated samples increase over periods in the very young 
sample and increase initially in the young and middle sample to period 3, after which, mean 
donations keep constant. Among the oldest, mean donations in the untreated sample are 
relatively low and stable.  
Figure 3 about here 
We also observe from the panels, however, that for some of the age-groups (Very 
young, Middle and Oldest) the treatment difference in mean donation in period 1 is 
significant.  This must be taken into account when evaluating the effect of social information 
since no information is provided in the first period in either of the treatments. To address this 
issue, we exploit the panel nature of our data by using a difference-in-difference approach 
with random effects similar to Harbaugh and Krause (2000).6 The baseline in each regression 
is period 1 in the untreated sample. The variable “treatment” measures the difference between 
the two sub-samples, and the interaction variable “treatment-period two” is the difference-in-
difference estimator. This is the interaction term of most interest; subsequent treatment-period 
interaction terms measure the effect social information in each of the periods and as such, can 
also be considered difference-in-difference estimators but since we do not control the 
information between periods, we cannot compare these effects across age-groups. We present 
our results by age-groups in table 2 below.  
                                                          
6 It is important to note that the results of the random effect model must be interpreted with caution due to the 
possibility of a correlation between the random effect errors and the regressors.  
Table 2 about here 
Inspecting first the pooled sample results, we find first that the treatment dummy 
variable is not significant. The main interaction of interest between the treatment dummy 
variable and the period two dummy is not significant, indicating that there is no significant 
difference-in-difference, and hence no effect of social information in the second period. The 
same holds for the remaining treatment-period interactions; there are no significant 
differences-in-differences for period three through five.  
This pattern replicates also on the age-group level. Repeating the analysis for each age-
group separately reveals no significant effect of social information. The only exception is the 
Very young age-group where the interaction between the treatment dummy and the period 
four dummy is significant at the 10%-level. Taken as a whole, table 2 indicates no significant 
effect of social information in our sample. 7 
Finally, to address the hypothesis that males and females differ in their sensitivity to 
social information we repeat the analysis for the pooled sample presented in table 2 including 
interactions between gender and the regressors as well as a dummy variable for gender and 
present our results in table 3.  We observe neither significant treatment effects, nor any 
significant gender effects. These results do not support the notion of gender differences in 
sensitivity to social information.8 We summarize this result below: 
Table 3 about here 
Result 4.  There is no statistically significant effect of information on average donations, 
neither in the pooled sample nor within individual age-groups. We find no gender differences 
in sensitivity to information.  
 
We now turn to analyzing the effect of social information on conformity in donations. 
To this end, for each period we examine the difference in the fraction of participants donating 
                                                          
7 In our experiment, we do not control the information given to the participating subjects. We provide a summary 
of the provided information in table 5 in Appendix B. As can be seen, information is confounded with period and 
there are only a few instances in which on could compare the age-effect on donation behavior controlling for 
informational content (e.g., in period 2 , Young vs. Oldest).  In cases where such comparisons are possible, we 
have not been able to detect any significant differences. Joint inspection of table 1 and table 5 reveals confirms 
this. Results are also available upon request.  
8 We repeated this analysis for each of the age-groups separately and found no significant differences. These 
tables are omitted but are available upon request.  
below the previous mean, equal to the previous mean or above the previous mean. We 
compare actual donation with previous mean given that in the treated sample the information 
provided is about average donation in previous period. In particular, we are interested in how 
this fraction differs between the treated and untreated sample. If information affects 
conformity, we expect the fraction of people contributing equal to the previous average to be 
higher in the treated sample than in the untreated sample.  Table 4 contains the differences in 
the proportion of subjects donating either below, equal to, or less than the previous average 
for a given period by age group. We report p-values for the hypothesis of no difference in 
proportions for the pooled sample (whole age group) and by gender.  
Table 4 about here 
We find significant differences within each age group (except 9-10 years old) but the 
strongest pattern arises in the 5-6 and 16-17. In the 5-6 age group, we find a significant 
increase in the proportion of subjects that donate more than the previous average (period 2 
and 3), a decrease in the proportion of subject that donate equal to the previous average 
(period 2) and less than the previous average (period 3). In the pooled sample, information 
about the previous average increases the proportion of subjects that contribute more than the 
previous average in early periods. This pattern replicates when examining 5-6 year old sample 
by gender with only slight differences between males and females in periods 3 and 4. In the 9-
10 age group, we find an increase in the proportion that donates equal to the average early in 
the game (period 2)  but in later periods we find increases in the proportion that donates less 
than the average (period 3 and 5). The effect in period 2 is driven by males, while the effect in 
period 5 is driven by females. In the 13-14 age group, we find an increase in the proportion 
donating equal to the average (period 2) and this effect is driven by males. We also find an 
increase in the proportion donating less than the mean in period 5 and this effect is driven by 
females. In the 16-17 age group, we find a consistent decrease in the proportion of subjects 
that donate equal to the average (periods 2 to4) and an increase in the proportion donating 
more than the average in period 2. We also find that males seem to move away from the 
previous average donation towards higher donations while among females the proportion of 
subjects that donate equal to previous average is not different, the proportion who donate less 
than the previous average falls in favor of a higher proportion donating more than the 
previous average (period 2).  We summarize these results below:   
 
Result 5. Providing information about the average donation has a significant effect within 
each age group except 9-10 years and in particular in the very young (5-6 years) and the 
oldest (16-17 years) age groups. In both age groups (5-6 years and 16-17 years) the general 
tendency is to increase the proportion of subjects that donates more than the previous 
average and to decrease the proportion of subjects who donates equal to the previous 
average. We find small differences in the behavior of males and females in the very young age 
group while in the oldest age group the decrease in proportion of people who donate equal to 
previous average seem to be driven by males.  We only find evidence of conformity in the 13-
14 age group. 
 
4. Concluding discussion 
This paper studied the development of preferences for charitable giving using a repeated 
dictator game with a charitable organization as the recipient. Our experiment was conducted 
in Medellín, Colombia, and our subject pool consisted of 384 children from the age-cohorts 5-
6, 9-10, 13-14 and 16-17. In addition, we implemented treatments in each age-cohort that 
either provided information about the past round or not. We found that mean donations 
increased with age, peaking at 13-14 years. From this age on, we found no further increase. 
This is similar to patterns observed elsewhere, for example, in Harbaugh and Krause (2000) in 
the context of dictator games and in Bennenson et al. (2007) in the context of linear public 
goods games.  
With respect to repeated donation behavior, we replicate a pattern found in Bennenson 
et al. (2007). Mean donations in the untreated samples increase with repetition in the very 
young age-group, follow an inverted U-shape in young and middle age-group and decrease in 
the oldest age-group. Moreover, among the oldest subjects in the untreated sample, mean 
donations are relatively low and stable. Compared to the study by Bennenson and colleagues 
– which employed a public goods game with a western sample – we used the cognitively less 
demanding dictator game with a non-western sample. Since their results are replicated here, 
we increase our confidence in the ability of even very young children to achieve and improve 
socially beneficial outcomes. Our study also suggests that their results may generalize further.  
Using a difference-in-difference approach, we did not find any effect of social 
information on average donation behavior, neither in the pooled sample, nor within any of the 
age-groups.  As it has previously been shown in adult samples that providing relevant social 
information can be successful in preventing decay of pro-social behavior (e.g., Bennenson et 
al., 2007; Servátka, 2009), we expected to observe differences due to information at least in 
the older age-groups. Our results suggest that social information was not necessary to attain 
relatively high donation levels across age-groups, or to sustain these levels with repeated play.  
We did not find any differences in average donation behavior with respect to gender. 
Throughout our analysis, we found no tendency for female subjects to donate more or less 
than males, neither in the first nor in following periods. Although to date the literature on 
gender differences in pro-social behavior is inconclusive, it remains surprising that we do not 
observe any gender differences in sensitivity to information, given the notion that women are 
more sensitive to context and subtle informational cues (see e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009). 
Finally, we find that providing information has an effect on the distribution of 
donations, in all age groups but the 9-10 year old subjects. In particular, we found that in the 
5-6 and 16-17 age groups, the tendency is to increase the proportion of subjects that donates 
more than the average in the previous period and to decrease the proportion of subjects who 
donates equal to the previous average. In the oldest age group, this pattern is driven by male 
subjects. We also find an increase in the proportion of subjects donating equal to the mean in 
the 13-14 age group. This supports the notion that early adolescents are more norm-adherent 
and attribute more importance to fitting in and that adolescents aged 14 are least resistant to 
peer pressure (Steinberg and Monahan, 2007).  
This paper studied the development of preferences for charitable giving in a repeated 
dictator game using a Colombian subject pool. While some results from previous work 
conducted with western subjects were also found here, others were not replicated in full. 
Future work may consider using more culturally diverse subject pools as a robustness check 
of major patterns of behavior.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1 
Mean donations with 95%-confidence intervals by age-group 
 
 
Figure 2 
Pooled sample mean donations and 95%-confidence intervals by treatment
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Figure 3 
Panels of mean donations and 95%-confidence intervals by treatment and age-group 
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 Table 1 
Period 1 mean donations by pooled, male and female sample.  
  Pooled sample Males Females   
Age group N Mean Std Se N Mean Std Se N Mean Std Se 
Mann-
Whitney p 
Very young (5-6 
years) 84 4.76 1.96 0.21 55 4.80 2.10 0.28 29 4.69 1.69 0.31 0.665 
Young (9-10 years) 100 5.38 1.46 0.15 50 5.54 1.57 0.22 50 5.22 1.34 0.19 0.7393 
Middle (13-14 years) 100 5.93 2.37 0.24 49 5.90 2.66 0.38 51 5.96 2.08 0.29 0.6635 
Oldest (16-17 years) 100 5.62 2.47 0.25 69 5.78 2.47 0.30 31 5.26 2.48 0.44 0.3649 
Note: p-values refer to two-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests of gender differences; standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2  
The effect of social information on donation behavior: Difference-in-difference estimation 
results by age-group with random effects 
Sample: All ages Very young 
(5-6 years) 
Young 
(9-10 years) 
Middle 
(13-14 years) 
Oldest 
(16-17 years) 
Dependent variable: Donation Donation Donation Donation Donation 
Period two 0.318 0.500 0.620 0.360 -0.180 
 (1.33) (1.06) (1.56) (0.71) (-0.40) 
Period three 0.672*** 0.690 1.260*** 0.780 -0.040 
 (2.81) (1.46) (3.18) (1.53) (-0.09) 
Period four 0.479** 1.119** 0.980** 0.280 -0.360 
 (2.00) (2.37) (2.47) (0.55) (-0.80) 
Period five 0.625*** 1.405*** 1.120*** 0.460 -0.360 
 (2.61) (2.97) (2.82) (0.90) (-0.80) 
Treatment -0.016 -1.000** 0.360 -1.140** 1.560*** 
 (0.07) (2.11) (0.91) (-2.24) (3.45) 
Treatment × period two 0.229 0.333 -0.080 0.220 0.460 
 (0.68) (0.50) (0.14) (0.31) (0.72) 
Treatment × period three 0.089 0.667 -0.260 -0.280 0.320 
 (0.26) (1.00) (-0.46) (-0.39) (0.50) 
Treatment × period four 0.469 1.143* 0.120 0.200 0.520 
 (1.38) (1.71) (0.21) (0.28) (0.81) 
Treatment × period five 0.276 0.571 0.140 -0.280 0.720 
 (0.82) (0.85) (0.25) (-0.39) (1.13) 
Constant 5.458*** 5.262*** 5.200*** 6.500*** 4.840*** 
 (32.25) (15.73) (18.55) (18.06) (15.14) 
Random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1920 420 500 500 500 
Groups 5 5 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses; * denotes p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Gender differences in the effect of social information on donation behavior: Difference-in-
difference estimation results by age-group with random effects 
Dependent variable: Donation 
Period two 0.318 
 (1.33) 
Period three 0.672*** 
 (2.81) 
Period four 0.479** 
 (2.00) 
Period five 0.625*** 
 (2.61) 
Treatment 0.048 
 (0.15) 
Treatment × period two 0.444 
 (1.02) 
Treatment × period three 0.257 
 (0.59) 
Treatment × period four 0.723* 
 (1.67) 
Treatment × period five 0.304 
 (0.70) 
Male 0.228 
 (1.48) 
Treatment × male -0.098 
 (0.26) 
Treatment × male × period two -0.382 
 (0.79) 
Treatment × male × period three -0.299 
 (0.62) 
Treatment × male × period four -0.452 
 (0.94) 
Treatment × male × period five -0.049 
 (0.10) 
Constant 5.322*** 
 (27.58) 
N 1920 
Groups 5 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses; * denotes p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 
Proportion of subjects donating more, less or equal to the average donation in the previous round by treatment, age group and gender.  
Proportion of 
subjects 
donating less, 
equal or more 
than previous 
average 
Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
Untr. Treat. p-value Untr. Treat. p-value Untr. Treat. p-value Untr. Treat. p-value 
V
er
y 
yo
un
g 
(5
-6
 y
ea
rs
) 
Po
ol
ed
 Less 21.4 16.7 0.580 54.8 23.8 0.004** 47.6 35.7 0.270 42.9 57.1 0.190 
Equal 38.1 14.3 0.014** 11.9 21.4 0.244 14.3 14.3 1.000 11.9 7.1 0.460 
More 40.5 69.0 0.009** 33.3 54.8 0.049** 38.1 50.0 0.270 45.2 35.7 0.377 
Fe
m
al
es
 Less 28.6 20.0 0.596 57.1 26.7 0.102 57.1 20.0 0.043** 42.9 66.7 0.205 
Equal 42.9 13.3 0.080* 7.1 26.7 0.171 21.4 13.3 0.571 28.6 6.7 0.125 
More 28.6 66.7 0.044** 35.7 46.7 0.56 21.4 66.7 0.016** 28.6 26.7 0.910 
M
al
es
 Less 17.9 14.8 0.763 53.6 22.2 0.018** 42.9 44.4 0.906 42.9 51.9 0.508 
Equal 35.7 14.8 0.078* 14.3 18.5 0.674 10.7 14.8 0.651 3.6 7.4 0.535 
More 46.4 70.4 0.075* 32.1 59.3 0.045** 46.4 40.7 0.673 53.6 40.7 0.345 
Y
ou
ng
 (9
-1
0 
ye
ar
s)
 
Po
ol
ed
 Less 36.0 40.0 0.682 34.0 34.0 1.000 56.0 54.0 0.840 56.0 48.0 0.426 
Equal 22.0 26.0 0.641 22.0 22.0 1.000 6.0 8.0 0.697 8.0 10.0 0.728 
More 42.0 34.0 0.400 44.0 44.0 1.000 38.0 38.0 1.000 36.0 42.0 0.540 
Fe
m
al
es
 Less 57.1 37.9 0.183 38.1 27.6 0.436 71.4 55.2 0.247 57.1 44.8 0.395 
Equal 9.5 24.1 0.741 23.8 24.1 0.979 0.0 13.8 0.079* 14.3 6.9 0.395 
More 33.3 37.9 0.400 38.1 48.3 0.480 28.6 31.0 0.853 28.6 48.3 0.165 
M
al
es
 Less 20.7 42.9 0.095* 31.0 42.9 0.395 44.8 52.4 0.600 55.2 52.4 0.847 
Equal 31.0 28.6 0.853 20.7 19.0 0.887 10.3 0.0 0.132 3.4 14.3 0.168 
More 48.3 28.6 0.200 48.3 38.1 0.480 44.8 47.6 0.850 41.4 33.3 0.567 
M
id
dl
e 
(1
3-
14
 ) 
Po
ol
ed
 Less 46.0 30.0 0.100 36.0 54.0 0.071* 42.0 48.0 0.548 36.0 58.0 0.028** 
Equal 6.0 18.0 0.067* 8.0 6.0 0.697 10.0 12.0 0.750 14.0 6.0 0.185 
More 48.0 52.0 0.700 56.0 40.0 0.110 48.0 40.0 0.423 5.0 36.0 0.159 
Fe
m
al
es
 Less 42.3 24.0 0.169 34.6 56.0 0.129 38.5 48.0 0.496 26.9 56.0 0.036** 
Equal 11.5 24.0 0.248 15.4 8.0 0.417 15.4 12.0 0.728 23.1 8.0 0.143 
More 46.2 52.0 0.700 50.0 36.0 0.320 46.2 40.0 0.660 50.0 36.0 0.318 
M
al
es
 Less 50.0 36.0 0.327 37.5 52.0 0.313 45.8 48.0 0.880 45.8 60.0 0.325 
Equal 0.0 12.0 0.083* 0.0 4 0.327 4.2 12.0 0.320 4.2 4.0 0.977 
More 50.0 52.0 0.900 62.5 44.00 0.200 50.0 40.0 0.490 50.0 36.0 0.328 
O
ld
es
t (
16
-1
7 
ye
ar
s)
 
Po
ol
ed
 Less 44.0 32.0 0.219 42.0 52.0 0.319 50.0 52.0 0.842 32.0 48.0 0.104 
Equal 28.0 14.0 0.088* 26.0 8.0 0.018** 22.0 4.0 0.007** 16.0 8.0 0.221 
More 28.0 54.0 0.008** 32.0 40.0 0.470 28.0 44.0 0.097* 52.0 44.0 0.426 
Fe
m
al
es
 Less 56.3 20.0 0.041** 56.25 53.3 0.873 56.3 53.3 0.875 31.3 53.3 0.220 
Equal 25.0 26.7 0.917 25.0 6.7 0.172 18.8 6.7 0.324 18.8 13.3 0.680 
More 18.7 53.3 0.048** 18.75 40.0 0.200 25.0 40.0 0.379 50.0 33.3 0.350 
M
al
es
 Less 38.2 37.1 0.926 35.94 51.4 0.179 47.1 51.4 0.717 32.4 45.7 0.259 
Equal 29.4 8.6 0.028** 26.47 8.6 0.052* 23.5 2.9 0.010** 14.7 5.7 0.219 
More 32.4 54.3 0.068* 38.23 40.0 0.880 29.4 45.7 0.166 52.9 48.6 0.719 
Note: Untr.=Untreated, Treat.=Treatment; p refers to a test of no difference in proportions. 
Appendix A: Instructions intended for online publication only (translated from Spanish) 
Good morning. Thank you for being here. My name is Andrea Guzmán. I am a student at the National University 
of Colombia – Medellín, and with me today are Diana Buitrago and Felipe Mejía, who are helping me with this 
study. Today we will play some decision making games in which you will participate and earn money.  How is 
this? Before we start playing, we will give you some instructions about the game; in the game you will make 
some decisions and depending on the decisions you make today, you can earn a certain amount of money. It is 
therefore important that you listen carefully to these instructions. All students will earn real money and no 
student will leave without money. We will give you ten happy face stickers like these ones (show stickers) which 
at the end of the experiment will be changed to real money in cash. Every happy face is worth (show exchange 
rate) pesos. 
 
Now that we have started, all communication is strictly forbidden. Those who communicate in any way will be 
excluded from the game and will not receive any sticker and therefore any money. If you have any question, 
please raise your hand and one of us will come and help you.  
All your answers are confidential and anonymous, this is, no one except you will know what you decided, your 
decisions are a secret. To identify you, during and after the experiment, we will only use the number you 
received when you entered the room.  This is, that number will be like your “name” during this game. This 
number will also be used when we give you your payment at the end of the experiment. Please, keep in mind that 
you need to write this number on all papers we give you, or else we will not be able to pay you.  
When the experiment finishes, you will be asked to leave the room. To receive your payment, about 45 minutes 
after you exit, you will need to present the little slip you were given with your number on it. Your payment will 
then be given to you in private in a sealed envelope. We do this to make sure that no one else but you get to 
know how much you earned in the experiment to keep your earnings confidential.  
Decision task 
I will now give you ten stickers of happy faces (Distribute happy faces). Your task is to decide how many you 
want to share with Fe y Alegría, and how many you would like to keep for yourself. Keep in mind that the 
number of faces you keep for yourself and the number you share, must sum to 10. Remember that you will be 
paid according to how many happy faces you keep for yourself (Distribute decision sheets). 
On the sheet that is being distributed to you now, in the square called “I want to keep”, you stick the number of 
faces you want to keep for yourself. In the square called “I want to share” you stick the number of faces you 
want to share with Fe y Alegría kids. 
In this experiment, any decision is valid. This means that you can decide to share all, some, or no happy faces.  
Example: 
You can keep all 10 faces for yourself and not share anything, you can keep 5 for yourself and share 5 or you can 
share all 10 and keep nothing for yourself (Write all combinations on the blackboard).  This is only an example, 
that does not mean that you have to do this, it is only for you to understand the game. Once more, out of the 10 
stickers you can keep for yourself as many as you want, and you can share as many as you want.   
 
In this table for example you keep 6 for yourself and share 4 with Fe y Alegría 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I want to keep  I want to share  
 + 
 
10 
 
Are there any questions? Please raise your hands and we will go to your chair to answer (Address questions in 
private).   
 
You will now have a few minutes to make your decisions. Please, do not forget to write the identification 
number you were given on all your papers. Do not speak to anyone until the experiment has finished and you 
have exited the room. Do not worry if others seem to finish before you. We will not continue with the 
experiment until everyone is finished and everyone has answered. After this we will collect your sheets. 
 
After we are done, you can wait for us outside the room so that we can pay you. We will call for you one by one. 
When you come back, we will ask you a few questions and hand you your money.  
After all experiments are done here at the school, we will add up all the happy faces that you have shared and 
donate this money to Fe y Alegría within 5 days. There will be a receipt of the donation published on the notice 
board outside the principal’s office.  
 
  
Appendix B 
 
Table 5 
Information provided in the social information treatment by period and age-group 
Period 2 3 4 5 
Very young (5-6 years) 4 5 6 7 
Young (9-10 years) 6 6 7 7 
Middle (13-14 years) 5 6 6 6 
Oldest (16-17 years) 6 7 7 7 
 
 
